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Abstract 
The combination of ﬂ  exibility and security (i.e. ﬂ  excicurity) in labour markets has become a pivotal 
feature of the European Commission’s view on the reform of labour markets across Europe. In this view, 
the Netherlands is seen as an ‘example of ﬂ  exicurity’, mainly because of its adoption of the 1999 Law on 
Flexibility and Security. Because this law allows for deviation within collective agreements, we argue that this 
is the most appropriate unit of analysis when analysing ﬂ  exicurity outcomes. We focus on three aspects of 
the F&S Law: notice periods, trial periods, and the use of ﬁ  xed-term contracts. We analyse collective agree-
ments at sector-level and ﬁ  nd that the ﬂ  exicurity-balance in these three aspects tilts towards the ﬂ  exibility 
side. As a next explorative step we use some sector-characteristics to explain the ﬂ  exicurity balance within 
sectors: business cycle sensitivity, openness to competition, scarcity of labour, and union strength. These 
four factors show a more diffused impact on the ﬂ  exicurity balance than we hypothesize. Page ● 6
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Introduction 1. 
The combination of both a ﬂ  exible and secure labour market has gained importance in policy debates 
since the 1990s. Employers must be able to adapt their workforce to remain competitive players on the 
international market, while workers must be provided with appropriate levels of income and employment 
security, i.e. the concept of ‘ﬂ  exicurity’ (Wilthagen 2002). A recent report of the European Commission in 
this ﬁ  eld states that there is no single ‘ﬂ  exicurity pathway’ that ﬁ  ts all countries, but that countries should 
learn from each other and their own past experiences (European Commission 2007). Empirical research has 
conﬁ  rmed these divergent patterns across Europe (Muffels and Luijkx 2008). The Netherlands are consid-
ered as an ‘example of ﬂ  exicurity’, mainly because of the introduction of the Law on Flexibility and Security 
(F&S Law) in 1999 (European Expert Group on Flexicurity 2007). This law is only three-quarters manda-
tory, which means that deviation within a company or sectoral level collective agreement is allowed for, even 
at the expense of the worker’s protection. This latter is a relatively unique feature of the Dutch ‘ﬂ  exicurity 
approach’, shared by only a few countries (e.g. Germany). It implies that collective bargaining plays a pivotal 
role in the shaping of ﬂ  exicurity at the sectoral level and that the social partners can adjust the regulations 
to the speciﬁ  c needs in the sector.
The aim of this paper is two-fold: First, we extend the discussion on ﬂ  exicurity from the national level 
to the sectoral level. Whereas most studies on ﬂ  exicurity take the national level as their starting point, we 
show that there are considerable differences across sectors within a country. We show how ﬂ  exicurity is im-
plemented in collective agreements (CAs). Second, we scrutinise the role of social dialogue. The European 
Commission points to the importance of “active involvement of social partners” as “key to ensure that 
ﬂ  exicurity delivers beneﬁ  ts for all” (European Commission 2007, p.18). The F&S law is designed to accord 
a strong role to the social partners; a study of the Netherlands could therefore serve as a benchmark case 
for other countries as a ‘pathway’ into ﬂ  exicurity (Wilthagen 2008).  
Taking the Dutch F&S Law as the starting point, the analysis centres around three aspects in this law 
that are allowed to vary within collective agreements: notice periods, trial periods, and the use of ﬁ  xed-term 
contracts (hereafter FT-contracts). The social partners can negotiate provisions deviating from these ele-
ments of the F&S law, altering the levels of ﬂ  exibility and security. Using data from a unique dataset, the 
analysis ﬁ  rst explains between-sector variation with respect to these three aspects of ﬂ  exicurity, and whether Page ● 10
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or how this sector variation has changed over time since 2000. In addition, the analysis reveals the factors 
that cause the diversity in the bargaining outcomes with respect to ﬂ  exicurity, i.e. whether the social partners 
either focus more on ﬂ  exibility or on security. To test this, four sector characteristics are distinguished: sen-
sitivity to the business cycle, openness to competition, scarcity of labour, and the position of unions. 
The paper proceeds with an overview of the policy debate on ﬂ  exicurity and the Dutch F&S Law (sec-
tion two). In section three we discuss the four characteristics that are relevant to ﬂ  exicurity and how these 
are expected to vary between sectors. Section four discusses the data and the methods used for the analysis. 
Section ﬁ  ve presents the results of the analysis of the balance between ﬂ  exibility and security for the three 
aspects delineated above and the effects of the sectoral characteristics. Finally, section six concludes.Page ● 11
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Flexicurity in the Netherlands 2. 
The combination of ﬂ  exibility and security in labour markets has become a key issue in the policy debate 
across Europe since the early 1990s. The notion to combine ﬂ  exibility with security developed in response 
to the deregulatory efforts of the 1980s and found its ﬁ  rst expression in the European Commission’s 1993 
White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment. It was formulated more explicitly in the Commission’s 
1997 Green Paper on Partnership for a New Organisation of  Work, and the 2006 Green Paper on modernising labour 
law to meet the challenges of  the 21st century.  It is furthermore a central issue of the Adaptability pillar of the 
European Employment Strategy (Wilthagen and Tros 2004).
In a recent publication, the European Commission has again forcefully argued in favour of ﬂ  exicurity, 
in order to deal with a globalising economy while at the same time reinforcing European social models (Eu-
ropean Commission 2007). The Commission distinguishes between four components of ﬂ  exicurity (ibid. p. 
12): ﬂ  exible and reliable contractual arrangements, lifelong learning strategies, effective active labour market 
policies, and modern social security systems. This paper focuses on the ﬁ  rst element, ﬂ  exible and reliable 
contractual arrangements that are embedded in “modern labour laws, collective agreements and work or-
ganisation” (ibid. p.12). The idea behind these contractual arrangements is “to help outsiders, (…) to ﬁ  nd 
work and to move into stable contractual arrangements” (ibid. p. 13). 
The Netherlands are considered by the European Commission as an example of ﬂ  exicurity. The reason 
for this is the introduction of the F&S Law in 1999, mainly the new regulations it entailed for ﬁ  xed-term 
contracts (European Commission 2007, p.37). During the 1990s, the policy debate in the Netherlands fo-
cussed more and more on increasing the ﬂ  exibility of the Dutch labour market, resulting in the 1995 White 
Book Flexibility and Security, calling for a new balance between ﬂ  exible and regular employment and asking 
the social partners to ﬁ  nd a compromise. The Labour Foundation (STAR) — a private foundation combin-
ing the central union and employers’ organisations for the purpose of mutual coordination and advice to 
the government — responded by negotiating an agreement. This Flexicurity Agreement of 1996 was the 
basis for the F&S Law of 1999. This law contains a series of adjustments of Dutch labour law aimed at 
redistributing ﬂ  exibility and security over various groups in the labour market. This roughly entails decreas-
ing the security for people with a strong position in the labour market, i.e. people with permanent, full-time 
jobs (the insiders), while on the other hand increasing security for workers with ﬂ  exible, small, temporary Page ● 12
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contracts (the outsiders). The F&S Law was negotiated against the background of the Dutch system of 
dismissal protection, which was, and still is, considered quite restrictive by employers (Houwing, Verhulp 
and Visser 2007).
The F&S Law not only established a new balance between ﬂ  exibility and security, but also fostered col-
lective dialogue because of its semi-mandatory nature.  In this way, the social partners are encouraged to 
renegotiate existing rules and regulations in case these are too restrictive or too permissive. This increases 
the possibility to ﬁ  nd customised solutions on a decentralised basis and is in line with the principles agreed 
in the ‘New Course’ central agreement of 1993, also negotiated within the STAR. This agreement advocated 
a trend in the direction of “organised decentralisation” and “negotiated ﬂ  exibility” (Visser 1998). From a 
ﬂ  exicurity perspective, The European Commission points to the importance of involving social partners to 
ensure that ﬂ  exicurity is beneﬁ  cial to employers, workers, and society at large (European Commission 2007, 
p.18). This is in line with other ﬁ  ndings that “decentralisation appears to be having a beneﬁ  cial effect on the 
introduction of ﬂ  exicurity” (Wilthagen, Tros and Van Lieshout 2004). 
In this paper we focus on three elements regulated in the F&S Law: FT-contracts, trial periods, and 
notice periods. Regarding FT-contracts, the F&S Law extends the possibilities for using such contracts. 
Before 1999, a second consecutive FT-contract was treated as a permanent employment contract that could 
not be ended without prior permission from the public employment service. However, when 31 days or 
more lapsed between two contracts, they were not considered consecutive. In order to circumvent offering 
a worker a permanent employment contract after one FT-contract, employers made creative use of this 31 
days-period between two FT-contracts. When the ﬁ  rst FT-contract had expired, the worker often contin-
ued doing the same job in the same workplace, but now dispatched by a temporary work agency. After 31 
days, the worker was again hired on a FT-contract by the employer. The F&S Law aimed to accommodate 
the ﬂ  exibility needs of employers by increasing the possibilities for using FT-contracts, but restricting this 
‘revolving door’. At the same time, the total duration had to be limited, and contracts with employers that 
could reasonably be considered the same (i.e. including temporary work agencies) had to be considered as 
consecutive contracts. The F&S Law now states that FT-contracts can be concluded for a period of maxi-
mum 36 months, or a maximum of three consecutive FT-contracts, with a maximum period between two Page ● 13
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FT-contracts of three months. After these three years or three contracts, the following contract is a perma-
nent one.1 
These provisions for FT-contracts were drawn up in direct relation to provisions on trial periods. Before 
the introduction of the F&S Law, the trial period was also set at two months. However, these trial periods 
were considered insufﬁ  cient by many employers. To accommodate their need for longer trial periods they 
often resorted to FT-contracts or hired people via temporary work agencies. Nevertheless, no agreement 
could be reached on revising the trial periods and only some minor revisions were implemented. Trial peri-
ods were deliberately left almost unchanged at two months as the increased possibilities to use FT-contracts 
could perform the function of a trial period. Trial periods were now related to the duration of the contract: 
for contracts shorter than two years the trial period is one month, and for longer FT-contracts and perma-
nent contracts the trial period is similar as before the F&S law, i.e. two months.
The reasons to amend the notice periods by means of the F&S Law were twofold: ﬁ  rst, the system of 
notice periods was considered unclear and complex, with various yardsticks to determine the notice period, 
e.g. the worker’s age, the duration of employment etc. Second, the notice periods were considered too long, 
hampering employers to make timely adjustments in their work force. With the F&S Law the system of 
notice periods entailed that for the ﬁ  rst ﬁ  ve years of employment the notice period is one month. For every 
consecutive period of ﬁ  ve years, the notice period is extended with one month, up to a maximum of four 
months. The notice period for FT-workers is one month. 
It is illustrative to see how these provisions in the F&S Law compare to those in Europe. Figure 1 shows 
that compared to the EU or OECD average, the Netherlands have lower than average notice periods, but 
a more strict trial period. Regulation with respect to the use of FT-contracts is mixed. Most striking is the 
fact that no justiﬁ  cation is required to use FT-contracts, unlike in most EU/OECD countries. Moreover, the 
maximum number of consecutive FT-contracts is higher, whereas the total duration is shorter than other 
EU countries but the same as the OECD countries.  
1   Taken up in article 7:668a CCPage ● 14
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Figure 1: Elements of ﬂ  exicurity compared between the Netherlands and the OECD/EU, 2003
OECD EU NL
Statutory period of notice at 9 months tenure 0.93 1.1 0.5
at 4 years tenure 1.42 1.67 0.5
at 20 years tenure 3.04 3.9 1.5
Trial period 3.66 4.07 2
The use of FT-contracts valid cases 1.71 1.74 0
max number of consecutive FT-
contracts
2.39 2.58 3
max duration of series of con-
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As mentioned, the F&S Law only provides the national level regulations in the Netherlands. As devia-
tions by CA are possible, we now elaborate on the reasons why different outcomes across sectors can be 
expected.Page ● 15
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Expected sectoral differences in the  3. 
demand for ﬂ  exicurity
As Figure 2 shows, we argue that the main inputs for collective bargaining on ﬂ  exibility and security issues 
are the demand for ﬂ  exibility and the power balance between the social partners. These inputs, in turn, are 
affected by at least four characteristics that can vary between the sectors, i.e. business cycle sensitivity, open-
ness to (inter)national competition, scarcity of labour, and the position of unions.
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The demand for ﬂ  exibility 3.1. 
The demand for labour ﬂ  exibility by employers is to a large extent driven by economic motives (Gold-
schmeding 1998). It closely responds to developments in the business cycle of an economy, and the expo-
sure to international competition. Fluctuations in the business cycle do not affect all sectors equally. For 
example, in sectors where product demand depends highly on the state of the economy, such as trade, in-
dustry, and construction, labour demand is more cyclical compared to sectors where the product demand is 
more constant, such as in government, education and health care. A more cyclical labour demand is likely to 
increase the need for a ﬂ  exible workforce, and thus, ceteris paribus, increases demand for ﬂ  exible labour.
Another element affecting the demand for labour ﬂ  exibility is the exposure to international competi-
tion. When ﬁ  rms are more subject to (international) competition, the demand for their products becomes 
more unpredictable, which translates into a higher use of ﬂ  exible labour (Rubery and Grimshaw 2003; Stone 
2007). In addition, stronger international competition disciplines ﬁ  rms operating in so-called exposed sec-
tors to keep production costs, and hence labour costs, as low as possible. Examples of exposed sectors are 
agriculture, industry, construction, transport and communication while the sheltered sectors include govern-
ment, education and services to some extent. Permanent workers can therefore be a ﬁ  nancial burden for 
such ﬁ  rms, since there are ﬁ  ring costs involved when these workers are dismissed. Instead, ﬁ  rms operating 
in the exposed sectors might therefore prefer workers on ﬂ  exible working arrangements. 
A third element affecting the demand for labour ﬂ  exibility is the scarcity of labour in certain sectors. 
Scarcity of labour can have various causes. First, labour supply in general can be too low because of low 
female participation rates, generous social welfare systems (e.g. unemployment trap), or a shortage of work-
ers who are willing to work fulltime. This can affect some sectors more than others. Second, there might be 
a mismatch between the required skill level in a sector and the skill level of the labour supply, which is cur-
rently present in the Dutch technology sectors. Third, a sector can have a bad image, possibly related to bad 
employment conditions. Currently, the education sector is facing such problems, largely because of the low 
pay that teachers receive. Fourth, it might be that the demand for the product or service is growing faster Page ● 17
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than labour supply. For example, this latter was witnessed in the information technology sectors during the 
late nineties in many European countries. 
The general hypothesis is that strong sensitivity to the business cycle, high exposure to international 
competition, and a high scarcity of labour are all positively related to the employer’s demand for labour 
ﬂ  exibility.
Security demand and the power balance between the  3.2. 
social partners
The outcome of the bargaining process does not only depend on the ﬁ  rm’s preferences and demand for 
labour ﬂ  exibility, but also on the preferences of workers. Trade unions act as agents for individual workers 
and represent their interest on a (de)central level in the debate with employers and government on work is-
sues. They want to secure favourable wages and working conditions for the workers, including employment 
protection and income protection after involuntary dismissal (Faith and Reid 1987; Freeman and Medoff 
1984). Employers are generally willing to share their proﬁ  ts in return for provisions in collective agreements 
to avoid industrial conﬂ  ict, which might be more costly (Booth 1995). In general, unions take a critical stance 
towards ﬂ  exible labour, because their constituency is predominantly made up of workers with permanent 
contracts. Flexibilisation and ﬂ  exible workers often pose a threat to the position of these ‘insiders’ in the la-
bour market (Gryp et al. 2004; Lindbeck and Snower 2001). The union’s stance against labour ﬂ  exibility also 
depends on the sector’s sensitivity to the business cycle and the exposure to international competition. In 
the exposed and highly sensitive sectors, where the layoff risk is relatively high due to fast changing demand 
in output (and labour), unions have a stronger preference for good protection of the workers compared to 
that in the sheltered sectors, where such protection is more ‘naturally provided’. 
Union power is weaker in sectors where the non-unionised market is larger and non-union workers can 
‘easily’ replace union workers. The bargaining power of unions depends largely on the number of union 
members. In sectors where the unions hardly have any members, they have a weaker bargaining position 
compared to sectors where union density is high. However, the scope of the union’s bargaining power is 
wider than its density in most countries and is also related to collective bargaining coverage (Visser 2006). 
When a CA applies in a ﬁ  rm, it covers contracts of both unionised and non-unionised employees. Con-
sequently, trade unions thus bargain for both union and non-union members. In addition, some collective Page ● 18
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agreements are legally extended to all workers in a given sector, regardless of whether the employer is a 
negotiating partner. We do not take collective bargaining coverage into account in this article but we will 
include it in the analysis in a later version. Finally, the scarcity of labour affects the union’s bargaining power, 
i.e. when labour is relatively scarce, the unions have a stronger bargaining position.
The general hypothesis is that strong union power (high density, high coverage or high labour scarcity), 
strong business cycle sensitivity, and high exposure to international competition are positively related to the 
union’s demand for security. When combining this with the earlier discussed preferences of the employ-
ers, the following can be hypothesised. When sensitivity to the business cycle is high and/or openness to 
competition is high and/or there is scarcity of labour and/or unions have a weak position the outcome of 
collective bargaining will be increased ﬂ  exibility. When these conditions are reversed, the outcome will be 
increased security. When there is a mixed pattern, this can lead to ﬂ  exicurity, i.e. higher ﬂ  exibility in some 
respects and higher security in others. Page ● 19
Hester Houwing & Trudie Schils
From Policy to Practice: 
Assessing sectoral ﬂ  exicurity in the Netherlands
Data and approach 4. 
Data on collective agreements 4.1. 
The Federal Trade Union Confederation (FNV), the largest trade union confederation in the Neth-
erlands, has set up a databank on collective agreements in the early 1990s consisting of all agreements of 
which the FNV is a negotiator, which is 92 percent (Schreuder and Tijdens 2004).2  Coverage of collective 
agreements is about 85 percent in the Netherlands, partly due to legal extension of collective agreements. 
By the end of 2006 about 1,100 different collective agreements were stored in the databank, including those 
that have expired. The ﬁ  rst step in our analysis was the selection of about 500 collective agreements, all 
with a term ending after January 1, 2005. We then searched for the earlier version of these collective agree-
ments, those with a term ending before 2002, which resulted in about 400 collective agreements for this 
ﬁ  rst wave.  The actual text of these collective agreements was scanned and the information on the relevant 
ﬂ  exicurity indicators has been put into a coding frame. This is explained below. The ﬂ  exicurity variables that 
are scanned include the period of notice, the trial period, and the use of FT-contracts. Regarding notice 
periods, only information for workers aged under 45 is used, because of the many different provisions for 
the older group of workers which goes beyond the scope of this study.
The FNV databank also provides other information, such as the number of workers covered by a 
speciﬁ  c collective agreement. By combining this information with the number of workers in a certain sec-
tor, provided by Statistics Netherlands, the coverage rate or weight of each collective agreement can be 
determined. In this way we can establish the share of workers in a sector covered by a speciﬁ  c regulation. 
The data for all collective agreements in a sector are aggregated using the weights of the collective agree-
ments, so the level of analysis here is the sector-level. The overall coverage ratio of the analysed collective 
agreements is 71 percent3. In addition, using the SBI code of the collective agreement, the observations are 
matched with the sectoral characteristics used as explanatory variables in our analysis.
2   The FNV CLA databank is used under contract of the Amsterdam Institute of Advanced Labour Studies.
3   Temporary agency workers in the Netherlands have their own collective agreement, which is in the FNV databank headed 
under the commercial services sectors. We have split this collective agreement over the relevant sectors in which the temporary 
agency workers are employed, using the distribution of temporary agency workers over the sectors of Tijdens et al. (2006). By 
doing so, our data match those of Statistics Netherlands on the number of workers per sector. Page ● 20
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  Data on sector-characteristics 4.2. 
For our four sectoral characteristics, we use data from the OSA labour demand panel and Statistics 
Netherlands (CBS). The OSA dataset is designed to gain more insight into the nature and size of demand 
for labour by organisations with at least ﬁ  ve employees. We used two waves, i.e. 1999 and 2003-2004, ena-
bling us to assess the sectoral characteristics at the start of the CA negotiations. A wide range of informa-
tion is available in the dataset and we selected the following variables. To measure business cycle sensitivity 
we use a categorical variable that shows whether the organisation is sensitive to the business cycle. It ranges 
from 1 (not or hardly) to 3 (yes, strongly). To measure the exposure to international competition we could 
rely on a dummy variable that indicates whether there is competition with other suppliers, however, no dis-
tinction can be made between national or international competition. In addition, we observed a very high 
correlation between the business cycle sensitivity and this competitiveness dummy (correlation ratio of 
0.9296). To avoid multicollinearity problems we therefore used the share of exports in total production as a 
proxy for international openness. To assess labour scarcity we use the number of vacancies as a percentage 
of total workers in the organisation, from Statistics Netherlands. Finally, the measure of union density is 
taken from the Labour Force Survey (Enquête Beroepsbevolking) of Statistics Netherlands. Union density 
is measured as the share of union members out of the total group of workers aged 15-64 working more 
than twelve hours a week. 
The OSA-data is available at the establishment level although our analysis concerns the sector-level. 
Therefore we have taken the means of the sector characteristics by sector. We corrected for differences in 
the size of establishments by using weighted means. Furthermore, in the OSA panel only nine sectors are 
distinguished, whereas we have 13, so we clustered some of our subsectors into larger sectors. In the cluster-
ing, we used the relative size of the subsectors to calculate the ﬂ  exibility and security indicators for the new 
sectors. For example, agriculture, mining and industry are grouped together in the OSA sector-clustering, 
trade and hotels and catering are grouped together and ﬁ  nancial and commercial services are grouped into 
one cluster. However, earlier it was shown that these sectors are dissimilar with respect to the observed ﬂ  ex-Page ● 21
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ibility and security indicators. To control for this heterogeneity, we constructed a variable that measures the 
heterogeneity in the clusters that include multiple subsectors. This variable is constructed simply as: 
  where N is the number of subsectors within the cluster, xi is the level of ﬂ  exibility/security of 
the relevant subsector and x  is the average level of ﬂ  exibility/security within the cluster. This indicator 
ranges from 0 to 1 with 0 implying perfect homogeneity and 1 implying perfect heterogeneity.
Table 1 presents summary statistics on the sectoral characteristics, showing the average ﬁ  gures for the 
two waves. We show the averages here to give insight into the characteristics of the sector and it is not our 
aim to explain changes over time. As expected, we observe a dichotomy when it comes to business cycle 
sensitivity. Sectors such as agriculture/mining/industry, construction, trade/hotels and catering, transport 
and services show high sensitivity, whereas public administration, education and health care are least sensi-
tive to economic ﬂ  uctuations. As for the share of export in total output, this is highest in agriculture/min-
ing/industry, and transport and lowest in the sheltered sectors public administration, education, health care 
and also construction. The indicators for labour scarcity show that the number of vacancies is on average 
highest in construction, trade and services and lowest in health care and education. It cannot be seen in the 
table that the number of vacancies have declined between 1999 and 2003, reﬂ  ecting a general change in the 
business cycle. The ﬁ  gures on trade union density show that most sectors have density ﬁ  gures of over 30 
percent. These averages hide the general decline in union density, visible in all sectors. 













Agriculture (A) Mining (C) and Industry (D) 2.14 16.96 3.50 44
Construction (F) 2.17 1.03 5.25 39
Trade (G) and Hotels and catering (H) 2.07 6.05 4.17 29
Transport (I) 2.19 12.70 3.35 35
Financial (J) and Commercial services (K) 2.03 3.80 4.77 30
Health care (N) 1.34 0.02 2.16 24
Public utilities (E) 1.79 1.67 3.32 26
Public administration (M) 1.27 0.17 2.48 41
Education (L) 1.20 0.00 1.23 37
Overall 1.80 4.72 2.81 30
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Measuring ﬂ  exibility and security 4.3. 
Next we explain our approach to measuring the level of ﬂ  exibility and/or security by sectors, following 
from the CAs. In general, for all CA provisions that are evaluated for this study, three coding categories are 
distinguished: ‘according to national law’ or the default, ‘less strict compared to national law’, or ‘more strict 
compared to national law’. From this we conclude whether the CA provisions lead to increased ﬂ  exibility 
or security in the following way. First, for FT-contracts we argue that ﬂ  exibility for employers is increased 
when the CA provisions on FT-contracts are less strict compared to national law, i.e. they either lengthen 
the period during which FT-contracts can be concluded to more than three years; extend the maximum 
number of FT-contracts that can be offered to more than three, and/or; shorten the period between two 
FT-contracts to less than three months. We have assigned scores of one in the ﬂ  exibility index for each of 
these elements that is present and a zero when they are absent i.e. equal to national law. Similarly, security for 
workers on FT-contracts is increased when CA provisions are more strict compared to national law, or when 
the maximum duration that the employer can offer FT-contracts is shorter than three years; the number of 
FT-contracts that can be offered is less than three, and/or; the interval period between two FT-contracts is 
longer than three months (i.e. a longer time span does not prevent workers from building up the right to a 
permanent contract). Again, we have assigned scores of one in the security index for each of these elements 
that is present and a zero when they are absent, i.e. equal to national law.
Second, for trial periods, the scores are as follows: trial periods longer than one month for FT-contracts 
up to one year yield a ﬂ  exibility score of one.4 Shorter trial periods than those stated in national law, yield 
a security score of one. When trial periods are in line with the law, they score a zero, both on ﬂ  exibility and 
security. Third, shorter notiﬁ  cation periods compared to national law score a one on the ﬂ  exibility scale and 
entail an increase in ﬂ  exibility for employers. Longer notiﬁ  cation periods than those stated in national law 
entail increased security for workers and score a one on the security scale. Again, when provisions are in line 
with the law, they score zeros in both dimensions.  
The overall ﬂ  exibility or security score for a given provision is calculated by adding the CA scores, using 
the weights as explained before. Consequently, a ﬂ  exibility score of, for example, 0.6 in construction implies 
that for 60 percent of workers in the construction sector the level of ﬂ  exibility due to collective bargaining 
is higher than that based on the national provisions laid down in the F&S Law. Note that at the level of a 
4   Trial periods longer than two months are legally forbidden.Page ● 23
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speciﬁ  c CA provision there is a trade-off between ﬂ  exibility and security; there can not be a simultaneous 
increase in ﬂ  exibility and security in one and the same CA-provision. However, when considering multiple 
provisions, or the aggregated sector level (i.e. multiple CAs), this trade-off does not necessarily exist. A win-
win situation can result in which both ﬂ  exibility and security are increased.
Estimation method 4.4. 
To determine the impact of our four sector characteristics, we estimated ﬁ  xed-effects panel regression 
models, since we have two time periods available. Because of the limited number of observations (n=18 
over two waves), we decided to run separate models for the various sector characteristics, with the models 
always including the above mentioned heterogeneity indicator and union density, as well as a full model 
containing all sector characteristics together. The dependent variables are the observed levels of ﬂ  exibility/
security with respect to (1) notice period, (2) trial periods, (3) ﬂ  exibility/security with respect to the use of 
FT-contracts, and (4) the overall observed ﬂ  exibility/security index.Page ● 24
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Results 5. 
  Flexicurity across sectors 5.1. 
Starting with the developments in the ﬂ  exibility-security balance in CAs for FT-contracts, Figure 3 
shows that in most sectors the room to deviate from the F&S Law is used, with large variation between the 
sectors. Note that the lower the bars (in all ﬁ  gures), the more the CA-provisions are in line with the F&S 
law. Overall, the extent to which deviations are observed has declined between 2000/2001 and 2005/2006, 
mainly at the expense of worker security.5 It could be argued that the provisions in the F&S Law with re-
spect to FT-contracts already match the employer’s demand for ﬂ  exibility and security. Alternatively, it might 
be the case that social partners are increasingly less able to reach an agreement on how to deviate from the 
F&S law. Note that ﬁ  gure 1 showed that the Dutch provisions on FT-contracts are already rather ﬂ  exible 
within a European context.








































































































































































































































































A C D E F G H I J K L M N Total
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Source: Authors’ calculations using FNV CA Database (2008)
5   The total effect is a weighted average of the sector effects, with the weight being equal to the sector size.  Page ● 26
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In agriculture and hotels and catering, as well as in public utilities in the period 2005-2006, the room to 
deviate has been used to extend the employer’s ﬂ  exibility. Whereas in agriculture, this has remained practi-
cally unchanged between 2000/2001 and 2005/2006, in hotels and catering the increased ﬂ  exibility is only 
observed in 2000-2001, while it was only observed in ‘public utilities’ in 2005-2006. A reason  for this can 
be that after initially expanding the possibilities that the F&S law offered, the social partners in the hotel 
and catering sector realised the provisions of the law sufﬁ  ciently met their ﬂ  exibility needs and negotiated 
provisions more in line with the law. It might also be the case, however, that no consensus could be reached 
between employers and unions in later years. In construction, public administration, and commercial serv-
ices, mainly an extension of worker security is observed in both waves. Although a combination of both 
increased ﬂ  exibility and security is rarely observed with respect to the use of FT-contracts, in education it 
does occur. In some CAs within the education sector ﬂ  exibility is increased while in others, worker security 
is increased.
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Figure 4 presents the observed ﬂ  exicurity with respect to notiﬁ  cation periods and shows increased 
ﬂ  exibility in CAs compared to the provisions on FT-contracts. Again, we observe an overall decline in the 
deviations from the F&S Law. Both security and ﬂ  exibility have decreased between 2001 and 2005, with the 
ﬁ  rst declining fastest. It is interesting to note that in this same period, the percentage of dismissals that was 
brought to court has increased from 45 percent to 53 percent (Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment 
2000-2006). In these cases, no notiﬁ  cation period applies, but usually a severance pay is determined by the 
court. Both increased ﬂ  exibility and security are observed in public administration, and education. While 
the overall level of ﬂ  exibility in CAs has decreased between 2000 and 2005, in some sectors it increased, e.g. 
in mining, construction, trade, transport, ﬁ  nancial services, public utilities and health care. The observed 
level of security increased between 2001 and 2005 in some of the same sectors as in which ﬂ  exibility was 
increased, i.e. public utilities, construction and health care. Finally, Figure 5 reports the observed ﬂ  exicurity 
with respect to trial periods in CAs. Interestingly, in both time periods predominantly an increase in ﬂ  ex-
ibility is observed, in nearly all sectors. This conﬁ  rms the earlier mentioned claim of employer’s that the 
existing trial periods are too strict. Trial periods are extended the most in trade, hotels and catering, ﬁ  nancial 
services, and public administration. 
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To assess the overall level of ﬂ  exicurity by sector, we added the above explained components together, 
using similar weights as those given by the OECD in the calculation of their EPL indicator (OECD 2004).6 
Figure 6 shows this overall indicator and nicely summarises the above mentioned patterns. In general, devia-
tion from the F&S Law has declined over time, mainly because of declined worker security. As mentioned 
above, this might be the result of a view among social partners that the F&S law provides an adequate bal-
ance between ﬂ  exibility and security, or that negotiations on how to deviate somehow were not fruitful. The 
more substantial decrease in security however points to a situation in which the ﬂ  exicurity-arrangements at 
sector-level have become more unbalanced in relation to the F&S law, in favour of ﬂ  exibility. This could be 
the outcome of an economic downturn that occurred in the Netherlands between roughly 2002-2004. This 
might have impacted sectors according to the sector-level degree of business cycle sensitivity and labour 
scarcity; These and two other characteristics are reviewed in the next section. 








































































































































































































































































A C D E F G H I J K L M N Total
sec_total flex_total
Source: Authors’ calculations using FNV CA Database (2008)
6   This means that the ﬂ  exibility or security score for notiﬁ  cation period is assigned a weight of 3/10, the score for trial periods 
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The established level of ﬂ  exibility in the F&S Law seems unsatisfying in most sectors, and unions ap-
pear to agree with higher ﬂ  exibility provisions in CAs. Most likely, these are traded off against other provi-
sions in CAs, such as higher wages, or other improvements of working conditions. Unions and employers 
apparently agree on higher ﬂ  exibility in certain aspects in return for higher security in other aspects.  In some 
of the more sheltered sectors, such as, public administration, commercial services and education, worker 
security provisions are highest. In agriculture and hotels and catering, on the other hand, mainly increased 
ﬂ  exibility provisions are observed, probably reﬂ  ecting the higher seasonal sensitivity of production in these 
sectors. This too is examined more formally in the next section.Page ● 30
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Flexicurity and sector characteristics 5.2. 
Table 2 shows the results of the regression models. Only a limited number of signiﬁ  cant effects are 
found. This can either be due to the limitations of the data and the small number of observations, but it 
might as well be that the sector characteristics do not affect the ﬂ  exicurity outcomes of collective bargaining 
that strongly and that other factors are at stake. Nevertheless, the table shows some interesting relations. 
Table 2: Results ﬁ  xed-effect panelregression of observed level of ﬂ  exibility/security in Dutch CAs
Flexibility Security











































































































































































Notes: t-values tussen haakjes, N = 18 in all models. Further controlled for within-sector heterogeneity in all models.
[1] In terms of  notiﬁ  cation period; [2] in terms of  trial period; [3] in term of  the use of  FT-contracts;  [4] Overall. 
First, we observe that a stronger business cycle sensitivity is related to a higher level of ﬂ  exibility in 
terms of trial periods (i.e. longer trial periods), a lower overall level of ﬂ  exibility, and a lower level of security 
with respect to notiﬁ  cation periods (i.e. shorter notiﬁ  cation periods). The ﬁ  rst and the latter effect increase 
the ease with which a ﬁ  rm can ﬁ  re workers, which is according to our expectations, but the decreased overall 
level of ﬂ  exibility might seem strange at ﬁ  rst. However, the relationship between the demand for ﬂ  exibility 
and ﬂ  exible labour and the economic cycle is not straightforward. In fact, demand for ﬂ  exible labour goes Page ● 31
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down as the business cycle reaches its peak, due to rising scarcity of labour and more certainty about prod-
uct demand. When the economy slows down, ﬁ  xed-term workers are the ﬁ  rst to be laid off (Zijl 2006). An 
alternative explanation is that the unions position themselves stronger against increased ﬂ  exibility in the use 
of FT-contracts in sectors with higher business cycle sensitivity (while this effect is not picked up by the 
union density rates). In the full model, the effects of business cycle sensitivity disappear. 
International openness does not appear to be signiﬁ  cantly related to any of our dependent variables. 
The number of vacancies, on the contrary, does have an effect on ﬂ  exibility and security outcomes at the 
sectoral level. First, it reduces the ﬂ  exibility in terms of trial periods, i.e. when there are more vacancies there 
is a lower tendency to increase the trial period in collective agreements, and the overall level of ﬂ  exibility. 
One can argue that, because of the shortage of work, the organisations want to hire the worker, rather 
than extending the trial period. The effect on trial periods remains signiﬁ  cant in the full model. Second, the 
number of vacancies reduces the security in terms of notiﬁ  cation periods. This implies shorter notiﬁ  cation 
periods in sectors with more vacancies, which is contrary to what we expected. Employers might not be 
willing to agree upon longer notice period for the new hires, because of the risk of a mismatch and result-
ing costly dismissal. On the one hand, it is likely that it is a trade off against the observed lower ﬂ  exibility 
in terms of trial periods. On the other hand, when there are more vacancies, organisations expect to hire 
relatively many workers. The future job match of these new workers is uncertain and the employers are 
not willing to increase the notiﬁ  cation period, but want to be able to dismiss the new hires in case of bad 
performance. 
In the majority of models, union density is insigniﬁ  cant, however in some models a small negative ef-
fect is observed on security in terms of trial period. It is either true that the effect of labour union strength 
is reﬂ  ected in other provisions in CAs, that it has no effect or that the union density measure is incomplete 
(due to legal extension of collective bargaining results). Page ● 32
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Conclusion 6. 
In this paper we have looked critically at the implementation of the Dutch ‘ﬂ  exicurity policy’: the 1999 Law 
on Flexibility and Security (F&S Law). The level of analysis we used is that of the collective agreement (CA), 
because it is at this level that social partners can negotiate provisions that deviate from the law. By analysing provi-
sions on FT-contracts, trial periods, and notice periods, we found that most deviations in CAs increased ﬂ  exibility. 
The increase in ﬂ  exibility was overall larger in 2001-2002 than 2005-2006, possibly caused by the fact that the 
room to deviate was initially used as much as possible, whereas over time, social partners found out that the F&S 
law sufﬁ  ciently matched their ﬂ  exibility needs. Another explanation could however be that the negotiations on the 
issue became more difﬁ  cult and social partners were not able to agree on how to deviate from the law. Increases 
in security in CAs were smaller than increases in ﬂ  exibility, especially in the case of trial periods. As with ﬂ  exibility, 
deviations expanding security decreased after 2002. The same mechanisms as for ﬂ  exibility could provide answers 
here: either the F&S law sufﬁ  ciently met security-needs, or negotiations failed. When looking at ﬂ  exicurity, we 
found a rising imbalance between ﬂ  exibility and security compared to national law, caused by a relative decline in 
security. This initial descriptive analysis manifested large differences between sectors in the Dutch economy. Our 
next question therefore centred on explaining these differences by means of four sector-characteristics: business 
cycle sensitivity, openness to competition, scarcity of labour, and union strength.
We hypothesized that when the ﬂ  exibility demand in a sector is higher and the balance of power between 
social partners favours the employers, CA-provisions would be geared towards extending ﬂ  exibility. Flexibility de-
mand increases slightly when openness to (inter)national competition and business cycle sensitivity is higher, and 
decreases with high labour scarcity. The power balance between social partners is also affected by labour scarcity 
and by the strength of the unions in the sector: high labour scarcity and strong unions should lead to increases in 
security. Our explorative analysis of the sector-characteristics, however, yields a more diffused pattern that stated 
in this hypothesis.  
The different effects for these three elements of ﬂ  exicurity show that just looking at the overall ﬂ  exicurity 
indicator hides the ﬂ  exibility/security trade-offs and balances that are made within different aspects of a collective 
agreement. Flexicurity is no homogenous concept, nor is the preferred ﬂ  exicurity strategy similar across sectors. 
We have shown that for both ﬂ  exibility and security elements, there can also be a simultaneous increase or de-
crease, pointing to the possibilities of win-win situations or ‘positive-sum games’, and not (just) trade-offs.Page ● 34
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